Conference paper, *Colloque international Philosophical Perspectives on Irrationality*, organized by Daniel Weinstock, Université de Montréal, Oct. 10-12, 1997.

THE IRRATIONALITY OF EMOTIONS*

Christine Tappolet

Université de Montréal

Emotions have traditionally been thought to be at war against reason. They have been thought to play a crucial role in what are taken to be typically irrational phenomena, such as wishful thinking, self-deception and akrasia. A related point which has often been emphasised is that many emotions are relatively impermeable to reason; fear, for instance, is liable to persist in spite of the firm and justified belief that there is no danger. By contrast, most contemporary philosophers or psychologists have attempted to show that far from being at war with reason, emotions should rather be seen as a kind of cognitive state. Such thinkers often consider emotions to consist in or involve such states as evaluative judgements, evaluative beliefs or evaluative thoughts.

Obviously, there seems to be a tension between the role traditionally attributed to emotions and the cognitive conception of emotions. Let us suppose that emotions are a sort of judgement. How then could they be responsible for the production of irrational beliefs or actions? More generally, it is not clear whether a cognitive conception of emotions can make room for their putative role in irrational phenomena. If the emotions are just cognitive states among many others, it seems difficult to see how they can play the special role they have traditionally been thought to play.

Instead of tackling this question head on, I shall focus on the role of emotion in akratic action. The main difficulty raised by akrasia is that it seems inconsistent to hold that akratic action is possible while also upholding the thesis that one's awareness of some action as most desirable, all things considered, is necessarily motivating. This makes for a dilemma, since both of these claims are plausible. I shall start by fleshing out this dilemma. After this, I shall present what I take to be

* I would like to thank Daniel Laurier, Al Mele, Daniel Weinstock and Kevin Mulligan.

an attractive solution to it. The idea is to distinguish between desirability judgements and what one could call perceptions of desirability, two things that can come apart. Such perceptions, I shall claim, are nothing other than emotions. To make this claim plausible, I shall draw on the analogies between the emotions and perceptual experiences. Such analogies suggest that emotions have content but that these contents do not involve concepts. Given this, it is natural to think that the emotions play an important role in the production of irrational actions.

1. Akrasia's dilemma

Akratic actions can be said, roughly, to be free and intentional actions performed in spite of the judgement that another course of action is most desirable, all things considered. It is not possible to act this way if a judgement that some action is most desirable, all things considered, necessarily involves freely and intentionally performing this action, provided one is able to do so. In other words, the problem which akratic action raises is that the following two theses are both plausible and incompatible:

1) Necessarily, if an agent judges at time t that, all things considered, it is most desirable to do x at time t and he is able and free to do x, then he intentionally and freely does x at time t.

and

2) It is possible that an agent judges at time t that, all things considered, it is most desirable to do some action x at time t, and the agent is or believes to be able and free to do x at time t, but he freely and intentionally does some incompatible action y at time t.

There is no need to comment on the incompatibility of these two propositions. It is rather the question of their plausibility that has to be addressed. Before

considering the reasons that support each of these claims, however, some clarifications are in order. The second proposition involves a definition of an important brand of akratic action, or more precisely an important brand of so-called *strict* akratic action.[1] The reason this concerns only some akratic actions and not all of them is that a comparative judgement of desirability is sufficient for akrasia: the agent judges at time *t* that, all things considered, it is *more desirable* to perform some action *x* at time *t* than some action *y* at time *t* and is or believes himself to be able and free to do *x* at time *t*, he nonetheless freely and intentionally does *y* at time *t* (Davidson 1980, pp. 21-2). For the sake of simplicity, I shall concentrate on akratic actions performed in the face of superlative judgements of desirability.

To avoid misunderstanding, it should be emphasised that in my terminology the judgement that some action is most desirable all things considered is different from the judgement that an action is desirable *relative* to these considerations. The judgement that an action is most desirable, all things considered, bears on what the agent ought to do *sans phrase*, not on what he *prima facie* ought to do or more explicitly on what his considerations make it seem he ought to do (cf. Davidson 1980, pp. 39-40; Pettit and Smith 1993, p. 58). The all-things-considered judgement is of the sort that results from deliberation: an agent makes such a judgement after having considered all things or more precisely at least all things that seem relevant to him. Thus, such a judgement not only differs from relative judgements, but must also be distinguished from the judgement that some option is desirable *pro tanto*, in the sense that it has some feature or set of features which makes it desirable even though it might have other features which speak against it (Hurley 1989, chs. 7 and 8). It might be said that when an agent judges an action to be most desirable all things considered, what he does is judge the action to be most desirable *pro toto*. Such judgements are those which Philip Pettit and Michael Smith call 'operative judgements of desirability'.[2]

[1] Cf. Mele 1987, p. 7. Cf. Rorty 1980 for cases which are akratic without being cases of strict akratic action, such as when an agent fails to commit himself to the values which appear in the major premiss of his practical syllogism.

[2] Cf. Pettit and Smith 1993, p. 58; and also Mele 1987, p. 5-6 for the similar notion of *decisive better judgement*.

What the second proposition tells us is that judging an option to be most desirable *pro toto* does not necessarily prevent the agent from desiring some incompatible option more, nor even from acting upon this desire, so that he freely and intentionally performs the alternative action. In many cases, this alternative consists simply in the omission of the action judged most desirable.

As even the philosophers who most firmly deny that strict akratic action is possible would acknowledge, common sense takes such actions to be not only possible but a rather frequent feature of our life. It seems that we have to agree with Sarah Broadie when she says that 'we all know that [incontinence] often happens; thus we know that it can happen' (1991, p. 226). Moreover, the simple fact that we can formulate a definition of akrasia without, one the face of it, uttering any apparent contradiction, as well as the fact that we seem able to imagine cases satisfying that definition, provide at least *prima facie* reasons for believing that there are akratic actions. There is little doubt that the burden of proof lies with those – Socrates to begin with – who deny that akrasia is possible.

So what about the first proposition? The claim is that if an agent forms an operative judgement, he necessarily acts accordingly. I shall call this the *operative principle*. This principle follows from (close analogues of) the two principles which Davidson formulates when setting up the problem (1980, p. 23), namely, a) that judging x to be most desirable, *pro toto*, necessarily involves desiring x most, and b) desiring x most necessarily involves intentionally and freely doing x, supposing that one is able and free to do x.

In fact, given the plausibility of the claim that akratic action is possible, it is not so easy to find the operative principle convincing. Recent discussions show, if anything, that this principle is far from self-evident. Of course, both opponents and advocates of this principle would agree that in some sense of the term 'normal', it is true that in normal cases, we desire most what we judge most desirable and we do what we desire most, so that we do what we judge most desirable. According to some philosophers, these are simply the cases that are the more common, everyday cases – such as judging that it is most desirable to have a coffee, a judgement which

is usually followed by the action of getting a coffee. According to others, these are cases in which there is no dysfunction – cases where the agent is not weak-willed, or does not suffer from another sort of so-called practical irrationality.[3] But the operative principle is stronger than both these interpretations of the claim that in normal cases we do what we judge most desirable. For according to this principle it can be said that an agent judges an action to be most desirable, all things considered, only on condition that the agent is motivated to perform the action. If the motivation is lacking, the agent might have attempted to make an operative judgement, but in fact he has failed to do so.

What then can be said in favour of the operative principle? I think its plausibility derives from that of a different thesis, namely the thesis that vivid awareness of the value (or disvalue) of some action which is open to the agent is necessarily motivating. If a smoker sees a film detailing the destructive effects of smoking – perhaps showing destroyed lungs or the painful death of a smoker – so that he gets a vivid awareness of the danger of smoking, he shall, it seems, be motivated to quit smoking. One might even plausibly think this to be necessary: it is natural to think that the smoker's vivid awareness of the destructive effects of smoking would necessarily motivate him to quit smoking (he might even stop smoking for a day or two). If he was not motivated to quit smoking before he was shown the film, this must have been because he was not yet vividly aware of the effects of smoking and their destructive character. In other words, he failed to grasp the reality of the danger involved. Once he has been made vividly aware of the danger of smoking, it seems that any failure to stop smoking would have to be due to other desires that override his desire to quit smoking.

If this kind of story is correct, then the plausibility of the operative principle depends on what we could call *Socrates' thesis*, namely the thesis that the vivid awareness of the value (or disvalue) of some action open to the agent is necessarily motivating for this agent, in the sense that it necessarily involves the desire to act (or to withhold from acting). This is not exactly equivalent to one of the famous

[3] Cf. Smith 1994, chap. 3.

Socratic paradoxes. However, it is close enough to the ideas that knowledge is virtue and that no one does evil willingly, so that willingly doing evil rests upon ignorance.[4]

What is the relation between being vividly aware of the value (or disvalue) of some action and judging this action to be most desirable? Actually, it may seem quite easy to get from Socrates' thesis to the operative principle. All we need to do is claim that the vivid awareness of something being (*pro toto*) desirable is or entails a (*pro toto*) desirability judgement. And making this plausible might not seem very difficult. It is at least most often true that our frightened smoker, who we take to be vividly aware of the dangers of smoking and hence of the desirability of not smoking, also *judges* that to refrain from smoking is most desirable. This is surely how things normally are. The question is whether this is necessarily so. Nevertheless, even in the absence of a proof that vivid awareness is or entails judgement, it has to be agreed that we have a *prima facie* case for the operative principle.

Where do we go from here? Some philosophers have denied the possibility of strict akratic actions.[5] This denial often comes with the suggestion to replace strict akratic action with a close relative. For example, Davidson replaces it with action carried out in the face of a *relative* judgement of desirability, that is, a judgement that some action is most desirable with respect to the reasons which support it.[6] Others – the majority – are more inclined to deny the operative principle and with it, Socrates' principle.[7] Given the way I have set the problem, it should be obvious that I propose to solve the dilemma by arguing that it is a mistake to think that being vividly aware of something being most desirable *pro toto* is or entails judging that this thing is most desirable *pro toto*. Thus, what I shall attempt to show is that Socrates' principle and the operative principle are distinct. The possibility of strict

[4] Cf. Plato, *Protagoras*; and Charlton 1988, chap. 2.

[5] We might mention Socrates, Plato and possibly also Aristotle. More recently, we have Hare 1963; Watson 1977; Davidson 1980; Charlton 1988.

[6] Davidson 1980. Note that Davidson formulates his claim in terms of comparative judgements.

[7] Cf. Stocker 1979; Rorty 1980; Jackson 1984; Mele 1987; McIntyre 1990; Pettit and Smith 1993.

akratic action would not be precluded by the truth of Socrates' principle, and we could keep the latter while discarding the operative principle.

2. Vivid awareness and the emotions

The suggestion I should like to make is that it is in virtue of our emotions that we are vividly aware of values (and disvalues).[8] The idea is that our emotions of fear, disgust, amusement, indignation and admiration, for instance, are perceptions of values. They present us with values, that is, with the properties that correspond to the terms 'dangerous', 'amusing', 'indignant' and 'admirable'. [9]

Why should one believe this? The reason is that emotions share many features with sensory perceptions. Both possess phenomenal properties. There is something it is like to have the experience of red and there something it is like to feel fear or to be amused. This, of course, does not entail that the distinctions between the types of emotions match the phenomenal distinctions – as is widely acknowledged, they do not. But one should not conclude from this that emotions do not necessarily possess phenomenal properties. A second analogy between emotions and sensory perception is that they are often caused by our environment. In the case of emotions, the causal chain will often be somewhat longer, since we need to have an initial access *via* perception or thought to the object of our emotion. In other words, emotions have cognitive bases; even if it is a real dog that causes my fear, I need to perceive this dog or at least to believe that there is a dog to feel the fear.[10] Sometimes, however, these cognitive bases do not refer to anything external. An imagined situation can elicit emotions. But very often our emotions are simply aroused by things in our environment. A third feature which is shared by both emotions and sensory experiences is that such states are not directly subject to the will. We cannot, by mere strength of will, cause ourselves either to experience red or to feel fear. The

[8] This section and the next one draw on ideas presented in Tappolet 1995 and Tappolet *forth.*.

[9] This claim goes back to the moral sense theorists Shaftesbury 1714, Hutcheson 1738 and Hume 1739-40 and to the turn of the century philosophers Scheler 1913-16 and Meinong 1917. More recently, the analogies between emotions and sensory perceptions have been underlined by McDowell 1985 and de Sousa 1987.

best way to get oneself to feel fear is to imitate the hero of the Grimm tale and look out for danger. In that sense, one can say that emotions are passive.

The main reason to think that emotions are perceptions is that like sensory experiences, emotions can be cognitively assessed. They are said to be appropriate or inappropriate, depending on how things are.[11] It is appropriate to feel fear if there is danger, but it would be inappropriate in the absence of danger. And it is appropriate to be amused by a good joke, while being amused by the ticking of my clock would be inappropriate at least in most circumstances; it is in general not something amusing, that is, something which merits amusement. Now, the conditions under which an emotion is appropriate are *correction conditions*.[12] An experience of something as red is correct – it is not illusory – if and only if the thing in question is red. In the same way, an instance of fear is correct – it is not inappropriate – if and only if its object is genuinely dangerous.

An important point is that if having a content is nothing more than to present the world as being in a certain way, the claim that emotions have correction conditions entails that emotions have contents. This, of course, is a minimal notion of content. On most accounts, it would be insufficient to characterise beliefs. In particular, it does not entail the existence of intermediaries, such as fregean senses, between the state and its objects. In this respect, the kind of evaluative content found in emotions may be compared to the kind found in a thermometer.

If we accept the claim that emotions have contents of this sort, then it becomes natural to claim that emotions are like sensory perceptions in that they allow us to be aware of certain features of the world, namely values. They do so, at least, under favourable circumstances, that is, when nothing interferes with them. In a less controversial wording, one could say that emotions are *criteria* of values.[13]

[10] Cf. Lyons 1980; Gordon 1987; Mulligan 1998; Elster 1999.

[11] Cf. Scheler 1913-6, p. 256 and Meinong 1917, pp. 129-31. For the concept of appropriate emotion, cf. Brentano 1889, p. 22 sq.; Lyons 1980, p. 8; de Sousa 1987, p. 122; Greenspan 1988, p. 83; Gibbard 1990; Mulligan 1998; Elster 1999, pp. 312-4.

[12] Cf. Peacocke 1992, p. 65.

[13] Cf. Wittgenstein 1972 and Mulligan 1990.

It should be clear that when making the case for Socrates' thesis, I was aiming at the claim that vivid awareness is emotional awareness. Our smoker's vivid awareness of the danger of smoking is nothing other than the fear he feels when faced with an explicit representation of the destructive effects of smoking elicits. Now, if we accept that emotions allow us to be vividly aware of values, we are only a small step from Socrates' thesis. It is generally accepted that the emotions or at least many kinds of emotions, necessarily involve motivation. Fear, for instance, typically involves the desire to run away from the perceived danger. This does not mean that fear necessarily comes with this specific desire, bur rather that fear, like the many other emotions, necessarily involves some specific desire or other. What desire this turns out to be depends on the whole set of beliefs and desires of the person struck by the emotion. One could say that emotions determine a set of possible desires from which specific desires are selected given our other mental states.[14]

3) Emotions and evaluative judgements

The question to be addressed is whether there is a difference between emotional awareness of values and evaluative judgement: only if emotional awareness is independent of evaluative judgement can it be claimed that Socrates' thesis is independent of the operative principle. What I need to argue, then, is that the emotional awareness of values does not entail a value judgement.

Can we suppose that our smoker is conflicted? That is, can we suppose that through his fear, he is vividly aware of the danger of smoking, but that at the same time, he believes that his smoking is harmless? The important thing to note is that on the face of it, emotions are often felt in spite of seemingly incompatible judgements or beliefs. The literature is full of examples of so-called irrational emotions.[15] Here is a case discussed by Hume:

[14] Cf. Mulligan 1998.

[15] Actually, this is rather a misnomer. A so-called irrational emotion might well be perfectly appropriate; the belief with which it conflicts can be simply false. For such conflicts, see Rorty 1978;

> [...] consider the case of a man who being hung out of a high tower in a cage of iron cannot forbear trembling, when he surveys the precipice below him, tho' he knows himself to be perfectly secure from falling, by his experience of the solidity of the iron, which supports him [...]. (1739-40, p. 148)[16]

What this case suggests is that one can feel fear while at the same time judging (and even having a justified and true judgement) that there is no danger. Given this judgement, it is less than plausible to claim that because of his fear the man in the cage also judges that there is danger. This would amount to the claim that he openly makes contradictory judgements. Thus, it seems wrong to say that the fear felt by the man in the cage requires the judgement that there is danger.[17] Now, a number of replies can be made on behalf of the claim that emotions necessarily involve evaluative judgements. One can claim that it is wrong to suppose that the man in the cage really feels fear, or that what happens is that he rapidly switches between contradictory judgements, or else that there is no problem in attributing to him such judgements if we suppose that they belong to different parts of a divided mind.

Instead of considering these replies, I would like to show how it is possible to accept that emotions do not necessarily involve evaluative judgements while at the same time claiming that we can be aware of values in virtue of our emotions. One might wonder how it could be possible to claim both that emotions have a content and that they are not judgements or beliefs. To solve this difficulty, it is again fruitful to consider sensory experiences.

What happens in the case of so-called irrational emotions seems very close to what happens in the case of perceptual illusions. Take the Müller-Lyer illusion. When looking at the two lines in this optical illusion, we perceive them as being of different lengths. We do this even if we know perfectly well that they are the same length. If the contents were propositional, the content of the perception would be that p, while the content of the belief would be that non-p. Now, some have argued

---

Greenspan 1988, p. 17 sq.; Gibbard 1990, p. 130. Note that these emotions are not necessarily akratic – the person who has such an emotion does not necessarily judge that there is good and sufficient reason for not having it (cf. Mele 1995 for the concept of akratic emotion).

[16] Note that Hume might have well taken this from Montaigne (cf. 1588, livre II, chap. 12).

that what we have here is not a case of contradictory beliefs, bur rather a difference in the nature of the contents. On the one hand, the argument goes, we have *conceptual* content, while on the other hand, the content is *non-conceptual*. To have a mental state with a conceptual content, a person must possess the relevant concepts. This, however, is not necessary for having a state with non-conceptual content. More precisely, a content is claimed to be non-conceptual if and only if the person being in the state with that content need not possess the relevant concepts, that is, the concept we would use when individuating the state of this person in terms of its content. What this means is that non-conceptual content has no inferentially relevant constituents; it is not constituted by concepts, where concepts are nothing other than the constituents of content we postulate to explain the many inferential relations between states such as beliefs or judgements.[18] In fact, the claim that emotions have non-conceptual content is just another way of putting the thesis that they are to a large extent encapsulated, in the sense that they do not belong to the inferential net in which our beliefs and judgements are caught.

If emotions have non-conceptual content, it is easy to see how the man in the cage can judge that there is no danger while at the same time being overcome with fear. His judgement has the conceptual content that there is no danger, while his fear represents danger non-conceptually; its content does not involve the concept of danger, so that he could feel this same fear even if he didn't possess this concept.

Many questions arise. Perhaps the most worrying of these concerns the relation between the emotions and (other) cognitive states. It might seem impossible to combine the claim that emotions have evaluative non-conceptual contents with the fact that they have cognitive bases. On reflection, though, these two claims are only incompatible if one supposes that the cognitive states on which emotions depend are evaluative. However, this is hardly a plausible supposition. At least in most cases, fear does not depend on a belief about danger; for many of us, it is quite

[17] For similar arguments to the same effect, see Rorty 1978; Stocker 1987, p. 64; Greenspan 1988, p. 17 sq.; Gordon 1987, p. 195; Gibbard 1990, p. 130.

[18] Cf. Evans 1982, p. 122-9 and 154-60; Peacocke 1989, 1992, chap. 3; Crane 1988, 1992; Lowe 1992, 1996; Tye 1995, p. 139; Bermudez 1998.

sufficient to see that one hangs above a precipice to feel fear. Thus, one can easily claim that fear needs a cognitive basis, whether of not this state involves a conceptual content or not, while also claiming that emotions of fear have the non-conceptual content that there is danger.[19]

If this account of emotions is on the right track, then emotional awareness of values does not entail evaluative judgements. As a result, one could maintain Socrates' thesis while rejecting the operative principle. That is, one could claim that one's vivid awareness of the values of things – and in particular the vivid awareness of the *pro toto* desirability of some option – is necessarily motivating, and at the same time deny that judging something to have a value such as desirability necessarily involves desiring that thing. Desirability perceptions could come apart from desirability judgements.

Given this, it is natural to suggest that strict akratic actions are characterised by conflict between an emotional perception of the *pro toto* desirability (or undesirability) of some option and a judgement about the *pro toto* undesirability (or desirability) of some option. On this account, then, strict akratic actions would not be a problem for what I have been calling Socrates' thesis – a thesis which I should in fact have called Scheler's thesis, since (as far as I know) he was the first to claim that the emotional awareness of values, which he took to be motivating, had to be distinguished from evaluative judgement, a state that lacks motivating force.[20]

Conclusion

As someone even remotely familiar with the literature on emotion will recognise, the account of emotion put forward here is far from standard. As I said in the introduction, most contemporary philosophers are cognitivists of some sort. But this is not all, for they also claim that emotions are or necessarily involve evaluative

[19] Note that the fact that we need concepts to ascribe this content does not entail that the content is constituted by concepts.

[20] Cf. Scheler 1913-6, pp. 87-8 and p. 87, fn. 3 for the claim that Socrates' doctrine that good will is grounded on the knowledge of the good is correct insofar as the knowledge involved is the feeling of values, but incorrect insofar as the knowledge is only judgmental knowledge.

beliefs, evaluative judgements, evaluative thoughts or even evaluative construals.[21] Thus, they all are committed to the thesis that emotions are or necessarily involve attitudes that have evaluative propositions as their contents; thus, the contents in question are supposed to involve evaluative concepts. In my view, however, this is a mistake. Even though emotions are cognitive states – the conception I sketched falls within the cognitivist camp – their contents are more primitive than those postulated by standard cognitivists. They do not involve evaluative concepts. Emotions, or at least many of them, can be thought of as a primitive information system which generally works quite independently of the superior cognitive system, but which has close links to motivation and action.[22] This might be quite helpful, for it allows fast and often appropriate action. However, it also makes room for conflict between emotions and judgements. This, I think, is what the irrationality of emotion boils down to. It hardly merits the name of irrationality, but it can explain how emotions can get us to act akratically and hence irrationally.

Bibliography

Armon-Jones, C. (1991) *Varieties of Affect*, New York, Harvester Wheatheaf.
Bermudez, J. L. (1998) *The Paradox of Self-Consciousness*, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press.
Brentano, F. (1889) *Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis*, Hamburg, Felix Meiner, 1955.
Broadie, S. (1991) *Ethics with Aristotle*, New York, Oxford University Press.
Crane, T. (1988) 'Concepts in Perception', *Analysis*, 48, 150-3.
Crane, T. (1992) 'The Nonconceptual Content of Experience', in T. Crane, ed., *The Contents of Experience*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Charlton, W. (1988) *Weakness of Will*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell.
Davidson, D. (1980) *Essays on Actions and Events*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
de Sousa, R. (1987) *The Rationality of Emotions*, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press.
Ekman, P. (1972) *Emotions in the Human Face*, New York, Pergamon Press.
Elster, J. (1999) *Alchemies of the Mind. Rationality and the Emotions*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Evans, G. (1982) *The Varieties of References*, Oxford, Clarendon Press.
Gibbard, A. (1990) *Wise Choices, Apt Feelings*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press.
Gordon, R. (1987) *The Structure of Emotions*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Greenspan, P.S. (1988) *Emotions and Reasons*, New York, Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Griffiths, P.E. (1997) *What Emotions Really Are*, Chicago and London, The University of Chicago Press.

[21] For the claim that emotions involve evaluative beliefs or judgements, cf. Sartre 1939; Solomon 1976; Lyons 1980; Nussbaum 1995; for the claim that emotions involve evaluative thoughts, cf. Greenspan 1988; for construals, cf. Armon-Jones 1991.

[22] Cf. Ekman 1972; Griffiths 1997, chap. 4.

Jackson, F. (1984) 'Weakness of Will', *Mind*, vol. 93, 1-18.

Hare, R.M. (1963) *Freedom and Reason*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Hume, D. (1739-40) *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. by L.A. Selby-Biggy, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1978.

Hurley, S. (1989) *Natural Reasons*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Hutcheson, F. (1738) *An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue*, Hildensheim, Georg Olms, 1971.

Lowe, E.J. (1992) Experience and its Objects, T. Crane. ed., *The Contents of Experience*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Lowe, E. J. (1996) *Subjects of Experience*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Lyons, W. (1980) *Emotion*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

McDowell, J. (1985) 'Values and Secondary Qualities', in T. Honderich, ed., *Morality and Objectivity: a Tribute to John Mackie*, Londres, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985.

McIntyre, A. (1990) 'Is Akratic Action Always Irrational?', in O. Flanagan, A.O. Rorty, eds, *Identity, Character and Morality*, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press.

Meinong, A. (1917) 'Ueber Emotionale Präsentation', *Kaiserliche Akademie der Wissenschaft in Wien*, vol. 183, 2nd part, 1-181.

Mele, A.R. (1987) *Irrationality*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Mele, A.R. (1995) *Autonomous Agents. From Self-Control to Autonomy*, New York, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Montaigne M. de (1588) *Essais*, Paris, Garnier-Flammarion, vol. 1, 1962.

Mulligan, K. (1990) 'Criteria and Indication', in R. Haller, et J. Brandl, eds, *Wittgenstein*, Wien, Verlag Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky.

Mulligan, K. (1998) 'From Appropriate Emotions to Values', *The Monist*, *Secondary Qualities Generalized*, ed. by P. Menzies, vol. 81, 161-88.

Nussbaum, M. (1995) 'Les émotions comme jugements de valeurs', in P. Paperman et R. Ogien, eds, *La couleur des penseés*, *Raisons Pratiques*, vol. 6, 19-32.

Peacocke, C. (1989) 'Perceptual Content', in J. Almog, J. Perry et H. Wettstein, eds, *Themes from Kaplan*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Peacocke, C. (1992) *A Study of Concepts*, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press.

Pettit, P.N, Smith, M. (1993) 'Practical Unreason', *Mind*, 102, 53-80.

Plato, *Protagoras*, trans. W.K.C. Guthrie, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, Penguin Books, 1956.

Rorty, A.O. (1978) 'Explaining Emotions', *Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 75, also in A.O. Rorty, ed., *Explaining Emotions*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1980.

Rorty A.O. (1980) 'Where Does the Akratic Break Take Place?', *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 58, 333-46.

Sartre, J.-P. (1939) *Esquisse d'une théorie des émotions*, Hermann, Paris.

Scheler, M. (1913-6) *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die Materielle Wertethik*, 2 vol., *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*, vol. I, 1913 et vol. II, 1916, in *Gesammelte Werke*, vol. II, Berne, Francke Verlag, 1954.

Shaftesbury, Anthony Ashley Cooper third earl of, (1714[2]) *An Inquiry concerning Virtue, or Merit,* in *Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times*, New York, Bobbs-Merrill, 1964.

Smith, M. (1994) *The Moral Problem*, Oxford, Blackwell.

Solomon, R. (1976) *The Passions*, Indianapolis, Hackett Publishing Company, 1993.

Stocker, M. (1979) 'Desiring the Bad', *Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 76, 1979, 738-53.

Stocker, M. (1987) 'Emotional Thoughts', *American Philosophical Quartely*, vol. 24, 57-69

Tappolet, C. (1995) 'Les Emotions et les concepts axiologiques', in R. Ogien and P. Paperman, eds, *La Couleur des Pensées*, *Raisons Pratiques*, vol. 6, 237-58.

Tappolet, C. (forth.) *La Connaissance des valeurs*, Paris, PUF.

Thomon, J.J. (1996) *Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity*, Cambridge, Mass., Blackwell.
Tye, M. (1995) *Ten Problems of Consciousness*, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press.
Watson, G. (1977) 'Skepticism about Weakness of Will', *The Philosophical Review*, vol. 86, 316-39.
Wittgenstein, L. (1972) *The Blue and Brown Books*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell.